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ABSTRACT 
This empirical study investigates the impact of property taxes, public education outlays, and other 
factors on interstate differentials in the cost of housing.  While the literature on geographic cost-of-living 
differentials is well developed, the literature on geographic cost-of-housing differentials is much less so 
housing costs consist of the price of housing per se for owners (including maintenance and repairs) or 
rental payments per se for renters.  Relevance of this research is elevated by the fact that the cost of 
housing is the main driver of cost-of-living differences between states.  OLS results imply that the cost of 
housing is positively a function of median family income, miles of shoreline, and the mean January 
temperature, and negatively a function of toxic waste releases and the presence of right-to-work laws.  
Finally, it is found that property taxes are capitalized into housing prices, thereby lowering those prices 
and the overall cost of housing, as it is narrowly defined, whereas there is modest evidence that public 
education outlays may also be capitalized into housing prices, thereby elevating the cost of house. 
INTRODUCTION 
Determinants of geographic living-cost differential (L-CD’s) in the U.S. has attracted the interest of a 
large number of researchers including Cebula (1980, 1989), Cebula & Todd (2004), Cobas (1978), 
Ostrosky (1983), McMahon (1991), Nord (2000), and Kurre (2003).  The study of geographic L-CD’s is of 
interest given that such differentials have consistently been found to be significant in explaining 
geographic mobility in the U.S. (Renas, 1978, 1983; Cebula, 1978, 1993; Cebula & Alexander, 2006; 
Ashby, 2007).  Most of the published L-CD related research to date has tended to focus on states, 
metropolitan areas, or counties. 
Less well developed is the literature on interstate housing-cost differentials per se.  Based on the 
database adopted in this study, housing costs consists of two components: (1) the housing price (for 
homeowners), inclusive of home maintenance and repair costs, and (2) the housing price for renters, 
i.e., rent per se.  Outlays on residential housing constitute approximately 40 percent of total 
expenditures by households. As Ashby (2007, p. 686) observes, “…housing…is the main driver of cost-of-
living differences between states.”  Hence, improved knowledge of determinants of housing-cost 
differentials per se may shed at least indirect light on the underlying causes of interstate living-cost 
differentials.  Accordingly, the objective of this study is to identify determinants of interstate 
differentials in the cost of housing (as defined).  This study focuses on interstate housing-cost 
differentials for the year 2006. 
THE CONTEXT 
In this study, the average overall cost of housing in each state, which takes the form of an index with a 
mean value of 100.00, consists of two primary components.  First, for property owners residing in their 
own homes, most fundamentally there is the price per se of housing (PH), which includes the cost of 
home repair and maintenance.  Property taxes are expressly excluded from the computation of PH.  For 
non-owners, the “price” of residential housing is reflected simply by their rental payments (RENT).  
Naturally, abstracting from cases of rent-controlled residential housing, residential rental payments tend 
to significantly reflect the underlying price (market value) of housing units being rented: 
RENT = f (PH, …), FPH > 0                   (1) 
It follows in turn that factors that influence PH should, to at least some degree, similarly influence the 
rental cost of residential housing, i.e., RENT.  Stated somewhat differently, while certainly not 
synonymous, housing prices per se and rent paid for the use of housing units per se are likely to be 
influenced by similar sets of forces, be they fundamentally economic in nature, environmental in nature 
(e.g., either amenities or dis-amenities), or reflective of public policy in nature, such as property taxes 
and public education outlays.  Clearly, whatever factors influence PH and/or RENT will of course affect 
COH, the overall average cost of housing. 
The analysis adopts state-level data, with Washington, D.C. being excluded.  To begin the development 
of the framework for the analysis, it is hypothesized that the higher the median family income (MFIj), 
the greater the overall demand for housing and hence the higher the overall level of housing prices and 
rents, ceteris paribus.  Hence, the overall cost of housing in state j, COHj, is expected to be an increasing 
function of MFIj, ceteris paribus.  In principle, this argument is consistent with previous research (Cebula 
& Todd, 2004; Cobas, 1978; Ostrosky, 1983; Kurre, 2003) that has found that the average overall price 
level in a regional economy responds positively to an increase in per capita income, the effects of which 
are transmitted to regional price levels through an increase in the overall demand for goods and 
services. 
The housing prices (and rent levels) comprising the overall cost of housing, COH, are likely to be 
significantly influenced by environmental considerations.  To begin, the roles of a more favorable 
climate and/or other positive environment amenities have been shown to be determinants of migration 
that may be capitalized in housing prices (Cebula, 1978; Cebula & Alexander, 2006).  In this analysis, 
climate is proxied by the mean January temperature, JANTEMPj.  This variable can be used to reflect 
warmer winter climates, i.e., climates with either warm or at least milder winters.  Treating warmer 
winter temperatures as a desirable environmental characteristic, it is reasonable to expect that warmer 
winter (i.e., higher average January) temperatures presumably may be capitalized into housing prices 
and rents.  Accordingly, COHj is expected to be positively related to JANTEMPj, ceteris paribus.  Similarly, 
greater access to the coastal areas (COASTALj), measured in this study as the number of miles of coastal 
shoreline on the Atlantic Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific Ocean, is generally regarded as a positive 
environmental amenity (Cebula & Alexander 2006).  As such, it can also be expected to be capitalized 
into housing prices and rents.  Consequently, COHj is hypothesized to be an increasing function of 
COASTALj, ceteris paribus. 
Next, the effect of toxic chemical releases (TOXj), measured on a per square mile basis, on COHj is 
considered.  This variable reflects pollution conditions in each state, and as an undesirable 
environmental feature, is also expected to be capitalized into both housing prices and, indirectly, into 
rents. In particular, higher levels of toxic chemical releases are thusly expected to reduce the demand 
for and hence the price of housing and rent levels, ceteris paribus.  Similarly, the presence of a negative 
environmental condition such as hazardous waste sites (HAZARDj) would be regarded as a dis-amenity 
that would be capitalized into housing prices, such that COHj would also be a decreasing function of 
HAZARDj, ceteris paribus. 
Yet another form of environmental condition is that of crime.  A higher level of violent crime, CRIMEj, can 
reasonably be regarded as a form of negative environmental characteristic.  As such, ceteris paribus, it 
would be expected to be capitalized into housing prices and rents, and it would act to lower housing 
demand.  As a consequence, it follows that COHj is hypothesized to be a decreasing function of CRIMEj, 
ceteris paribus. 
Section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley Act provides that each state shall have the right to enact “right-to-
work” laws, laws that provide workers/employees the legal right to refuse to join unions in their place of 
employment. By nature, states with right-to-work laws (RTWj) tend to be states with weaker labor union 
influences.  Accordingly, as found in Cebula (1980), Ostrosky (1983) and Lacombe (2006, P. 402), it is 
argued that because of weaker labor union power, the unit costs of production are typically lower in 
states having right-to-work legislation.  These lower labor costs also presumably apply to housing 
construction. Lower labor costs of housing construction in right-to-work states are in turn then 
hypothesized to be reflected in lower housing prices and, to at least some degree, in lower rents, ceteris 
paribus.  Logically, it then follows that COHj is expected also to be a decreasing function of RTWj, ceteris 
paribus.  Furthermore, in states with right-to-work laws, weaker labor unions might well also imply 
lower repair and maintenance costs for housing, i.e., possibly lower costs of carpentry, electrical repairs, 
and plumbing work.  If true, this would reinforce the negative impact of RTWj on COHj. 
Finally, there is the impact of government taxes and outlays on the cost of housing to consider.  Based 
on Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971), it is expected that the impact of government policies such as 
property taxes and public education spending would be capitalized into housing prices.  As Tiebout 
(1956, p. 418) hypothesizes, given the pattern of revenue and expenditure pattern “…the consumer-
voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of preferences.”  
Consumer-voters will, as Tullock (1971) also suggests, consider the bundle of taxes and local public 
goods when deciding where to live.  Thus, a consumer-voter will capitalize the property tax (PROPTX) 
associated with a unit of housing into its price; similarly, a consumer-voter will capitalize the value of 
public goods and services associated with that unit of housing into its price. 
In terms of the present study, then, the property tax will be capitalized into the cost of housing (which 
capitalization would lower the price of housing), whereas the government expenditures on, say, public 
education will also be capitalized into the cost of housing (which capitalization would tend to raise the 
price of housing).  In particular, it is hypothesized in this study that COHj is a decreasing function of 
PROPTXj (measured here as the per capita property tax burden in state j), ceteris paribus, and an 
increasing function of PUBEDSPj (per capita public education outlays in state j), ceteris paribus. 
Based upon the aforementioned arguments, the cost of housing in a state is modeled by: 
COH = f (MFI, JANTEMP, COASTAL, TOX, HAZARD, CRIME, RTW, PROPTX, PUBEDSP), fMFI > 0, 
 fJANTEMP > 0, fCOASTAL  > 0, fTOX < 0, fHAZARD < 0, fCRIME < 0, fRTW < 0, fPROPTX < 0, fPUBEDSP > 0                                   (2) 
EMPIRICAL MODEL AND FINDINGS 
Based on the eclectic model developed above, the following reduced-form equation is estimated: 
COHj = a0 + a1 MFLj + a2 JANTEMPj + a3 COASTALj + a4 TOXj + a5 HAZARDj + a6 CRIMEj + a7 RTWj + a8 
PROPTXj + a9 PUBEDSPj + u                 (3) 
where: 
COHj = the overall cost of housing in state j in the first quarter of the year 2006, expressed as an index 
(the latter index has a mean value = 100.00); 
MFIj = the median family income level in state j, 2004; 
JANTEMPj = the mean January temperature in state j; 
COASTALj = the number of miles of coastal shoreline in state j along the Atlantic Ocean, the Gulf of 
Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean; 
TOXj = toxic chemical releases into the air, water, or land of state j, in thousands of pounds, divided by 
the total number of square miles in state j, 2004; 
 HAZARDj = the number of hazardous waste sites in state j, divided by the number of square miles in 
state j, 2004; 
CRIMEj = the number of violent crimes in state j per 100,000 population, 2004; 
RTWj = a binary variable indicating whether state j is a right-to-work state: RTWj = 1 for those states 
where right-to-work laws are in effect, and RTWj = 0 otherwise; 
PROPTXj = per capita state plus local property tax level in state j in 2002; and 
PUBEDSPj = per capita state plus local government spending on public education in state j, 2002. 
Based on the arguments provided in the previous section of this study, it is expected that: 
a1 > 0, a2 > 0, a3 > 0, a4 < 0, a5 < 0, a6 < 0, a7 < 0, a8 < 0, a9  > 0              (4) 
The date sources are as follow: 
COH: ACCRA (2007); MFI, JANTEMP, COASTAL, TOX, HAZARD, CRIME, PROPTX, PUBEDSP: U.S. Census 
Bureau (2006, Tables, 680, 378, 345, 367, 297, 431, 431, 17); 
RTW: U.S. Census Bureau (2005, Table 640). 
Estimating equation (4) by OLS, adopting the White (1980) correction for heteroskedasticity, yields the 
following: 
COHj = 64.27 + 0.0003** MFIj  0.364** JANTEMPj + 0.00039** COASTALj – 4088.2** TOXj – 4.08 HAZARDj  
  (+3.29)         (+4.58)           (+2.73)  (-4.01)   (-1.33) 
– 0.0057 CRIMEj – 7.18** RTWj – 0.00063*
 PROPTXj + 0.0083 PUBEDSPj  
(-1.19)       (-3.54)       (-2.30)  (+1.95) 
R2 = 0.70, adjR2 = 0.63, F = 10.23**        (6) 
where terms in parentheses are t-values and ** indicates statistical significance at the one percent level 
whereas * indicates statistical significance at the five percent level. 
In estimation (6), all nine of the estimated coefficients exhibit the expected signs, with five being 
statistically significant at the one percent level, one being significant at the five percent level, and one 
being significant at the six percent level.  The coefficient of determination of 0.70 implies that the model 
explains roughly seven-tenths of the interstate variation in the cost of housing as defined.  Finally, the F-
statistic of 10.23 attests to the overall strength of the model. 
In equation (6), the estimated coefficient on variable MFI is positive and significant at the one percent 
level.  This finding seemingly implies that the higher the median family income, the greater is the 
demand for housing and hence the higher is the cost of housing.  The coefficient on variable JANTEMP is 
positive and significant at the one percent level.  This supports our hypothesis that the warmer the 
mean January temperature, the greater the cost of housing, since this amenity is capitalized into the 
price of housing.  The estimated coefficient on the COASTAL variable is also positive and significant at 
the one percent level, implying that the greater the number of miles of shoreline (as defined), the 
greater the demand for housing.  Alternatively stated, the number of miles of shoreline is regarded as an 
amenity, one that is capitalized into hosing prices and hence raises the cost of housing.  The estimated 
coefficient on the variable TOX is negative and significant at the one percent level, lending support for 
our hypothesis that the higher the level of toxic emissions, the lower the cost of housing since this dis-
amenity is capitalized into the price of housing.  Although the coefficient on the HAZARD variable is 
negative, as expected, it fails to be significant at an acceptable level.  Thus, this variable does not appear 
to be a factor in either the price of housing or the cost of housing.  The estimated coefficient on the 
crime variable, CRIME, is negative, as hypothesized, but not significant at the ten percent level.  This 
outcome implies that the higher levels of violent crime are not capitalized into the price of housing.  
Next, the estimated coefficient of the RTW variable is negative, as expected, and significant at the one 
percent level.  This finding implies that right-to-work laws and thus weaker labor unions imply have 
lower unit labor costs.  This in turn arguably reduces the cost of housing construction (and perhaps even 
the cost of housing repair and maintenance), which in turn reduces the cost of housing where right-to-
work laws exist.  The estimated coefficient on the property tax variable, PROPTX, is negative as 
hypothesized and statistically significant at the 2.5 percent level.  Thus, as one would logically infer from 
the works by Tiebout (1956) and Tullock (1971), property taxes are capitalized into housing prices, with 
the result being that higher property tax levels reduce housing prices and hence reduce the cost of 
housing.  Finally, the estimated coefficient on the PUBEDSP variable is positive, as hypothesized, and 
statistically significant at the six percent level.  Clearly, since this variable is nearly significant at the five 
percent (i.e., at an “acceptable”) level, it is reasonable to infer that there is at least modest support for 
the hypothesis that a higher level of state plus local public education spending per capita maybe 
capitalized into housing prices and hence lead to a higher cost of housing. 
CONCLUSION 
This analysis empirically finds that the cost of housing (as defined) is an increasing function of median 
family income, the mean January temperature, and the number of miles of shoreline on the Atlantic 
Ocean, Gulf of Mexico, and Pacific Ocean.  In addition, the overall cost of housing appears to be a 
decreasing function of toxic chemical releases and the presence of right-to-work laws. Finally, the cost of 
housing appears to be a decreasing function of property taxation levels.  That is, there is evidence that 
property taxes are capitalized into housing prices and thereby reduce the cost of housing per se.  
Furthermore, there is modest evidence that per capita public education spending is capitalized into 
housing prices and thereby raises the cost of housing per se. 
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